Combined Operations in the Civil War

 Rowena Reed undertakes an ambitious project with her work Combined Operation in the Civil War. She attempts to study “combined operations” during the American Civil War, though she is truly studying “joint operations.” She defines combined operations as all operations that required “strategic or tactical cooperation between naval and land forces under separate command” of the Union forces. As such, she tends to spend more time devoted to the political and strategic developments of these combined operations rather than their outcomes. She divides her work into three sections, in order to examine the combined operations chronologically.

            Reed’s work is not a traditional military history. Rather than providing overwhelming details of specific battles, she turns her attention to men who created policies and decided strategy. She explores the political and technological changes that affected decisions to engage in combined operations or not to. She believes that the political factors affected the use of combined operations more than military strategy. For those interested in the political aspects of the Civil War, this is an excellent work.

            Her first section explores the combined strategy from April of 1861 to March of 1862. She begins with Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation of the blockade. She finds that both the Army and the Navy had produced “amateurish” leadership. The Navy in particular was in desperate need of more decisive leadership. The lack of a clear leadership and delegated responsibilities caused great confusion in the early combined operations. Another difficultly developed with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army; the civilians in the Cabinet did often not appreciate the true nature of war. The various difficulties continued to plague the Navy and the Army.

    

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